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Using a consistent comparative dataset for 14 EU countries, we explore the earnings mobility-inequality 
linkage in the EU over the period 1994-2001 on two axes: first the evolution of short-term mobility and 
its link with cross-sectional inequality; second, the evolution of long-term mobility relative to short-term 
mobility  and  the  implications  for  lifetime  or  long-term  inequality.  We  use  two  types  of  mobility 
measures: (i) a rank measure derived from the changes in the individual ranks in the earnings distribution; 
(ii) a recent measure of mobility as an equalizer of longer-term incomes, complementary to the well-
known Shorrocks index. We find evidence supporting a negative association between the evolution of 
cross-sectional inequality and short-term rank mobility across the EU. Long-term, Denmark appears to 
have the most mobile earnings distribution with the second highest equalizing effect in the EU. The only 
disequalizing  mobility  in  a  lifetime  perspective  is  found  in  Portugal.  Besides  making  a  substantive 
contribution to the literature on cross-national comparisons of earnings mobility at the EU level, our paper 
brings  evidence  to  the  debate  regarding  the  ability  of  the  Shorrocks  index  in  capturing  the  true 
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1.  Introduction 
Interest in the extent of mobility in individual earnings over time has increased in recent years and 
was fuelled by the rise in earnings inequality experienced by many developed countries during the 1980s 
and 1990s, which triggered a strong debate with respect to the driving factors and the implications of this 
increase.  Some  analysts  argue  that  rising  annual  inequality  does  not  necessarily  have  negative 
implications. This statement relies on the “offsetting mobility” argument, which states that if there has 
been a sufficiently large simultaneous increase in mobility, the inequality of income measured over a 
longer period of time, such as lifetime income or “permanent” income - can be lower despite the rise in 
annual inequality, with a positive impact on social welfare. This statement, however, holds only under the 
assumption that individuals are not averse to income variability, future risk or multi-period inequality 
(Creedy and Wilhelm, 2002; Gottschalk and Spolaore, 2002). There is not a complete agreement in the 
literature on the value judgement of income mobility (Atkinson, Bourguignon, and Morrisson, 1992).  
Those that value income mobility positively perceive it in two ways: as a goal in its own right or as an 
instrument to another end. The goal of having a mobile society is linked to the goal of securing equality of 
opportunity in the labour market and of having a more flexible and efficient economy (Friedman, 1962; 
Atkinson et al., 1992). The instrumental justification for mobility takes place in the context of achieving 
distributional equity: lifetime equity depends on the extent of movement up and down in the earnings 
distribution over the lifetime (Atkinson et al., 1992). In this line of thought, Friedman (1962) underlined 
the role of social mobility in reducing lifetime earnings differentials between individuals, by allowing 
them to change their position in the income distribution over time. Thus earnings mobility is perceived in 
the literature as a way out of poverty. In the absence of mobility the same individuals remain stuck at the 
bottom  of  the earnings  distribution,  hence annual  earnings  differentials  are  transformed  into  lifetime 
differentials. All in all, mobility is seen as a bridge between short and lifetime earnings differentials: a 
cross-sectional snapshot of income distribution overstates lifetime inequality to a degree that depends on 
the degree of earnings mobility. If countries have different earnings mobility levels, then single-year 
inequality country rankings may lead to a misleading picture of long-term inequality ranking. Simple 
inferences about lifetime income distributions cannot be made on the basis of cross-sectional distributions 
alone, thus the need for information on earnings mobility.  
In order to understand the evolution of economic inequality and opportunity across countries, and the 
implications for lifetime inequality, it is crucial to complement the analysis of cross-sectional inequality 
with the analysis of longer-term inequality and the analysis of earnings mobility. As previous studies 
demonstrated, attaining comparability across countries in a single year is a demanding task. Doing so for 2 
 
multi-year studies has rarely been attempted.
1 Using a consistent comparative dataset for 14 EU countries 
–  the  European  Community  Household  Panel  (ECHP)  –  the  present  study  explores  the  following 
questions:  
(i) What is the country ranking with respect to earnings inequality and how does the ranking change 
with the horizon over which inequality is measured?  
(ii)  Did  short-term  mobility  increase  over  time  across  the  EU  and  what  are  the  links  with  the 
evolution of cross-sectional earnings inequality? 
(iii) Did short-term mobility become more or less equalizing over time and how does it differ across 
the EU? 
(iv)  Is  there  any  earnings  mobility  in  a  long-term  perspective,  meaning  are  the  relative  income 
positions observed on an annual basis shuffled long-term, and how does it differ across the EU? 
(v) To what extent does earnings mobility work to equalize/disequalize longer-term earnings relative 
to cross-sectional inequality and how does it differ across the EU? 
(vi) What is the ordering of countries with respect to the mobility of earnings and what are the 
implications for the country ranking in lifetime earnings inequality?  
The  cross-national  comparative  perspective  at  the  EU  level  is  motivated  primarily  by  the 
heterogeneity  across  the  EU:  countries  with  different  systems  are  expected  to  trigger  different 
distributional outcomes, both in an annual and a lifetime perspective. The economic reality of the 1990s 
in Europe, when the single market was implemented (1992) and the single currency was being prepared 
(Maastricht criteria adopted in 1993), increased the pressure on the European labour markets to change. 
Since the early 1990s influenced by the 1994 OECD Job Strategy, Europe has been moving towards more 
flexible labour markets, from labour shedding to employment-friendly reforms, expected to worsen the 
trade-off between a strong employment performance and a more equal distribution of earnings (OECD, 
2004). But the pace of change was different across Europe (Palier, 2010) supporting the expectation of 
increased country-heterogeneity with respect to the labour market structure and the distribution of labour 
market income across the EU, both in an annual and a lifetime perspective.  
We use two types of mobility measures: (i) a rank measure derived from the changes in the individual 
ranks in the earnings distribution Dickens (1999); (ii) a new measure of mobility as an equalizer of 
longer-term incomes - developed by Fields (2008) – complementary to the well-known Shorrocks (1978) 
index. 
The contribution of our study to the existing literature is threefold.  
First, at the EU level, no study has attempted to explore and to understand in a consistent comparative 
fashion the different facets of earnings mobility-inequality story over a more recent period and covering a 
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longer time frame than six years. The number of consistent comparative studies on earnings mobility is 
limited because of the lack of sufficiently comparable panel cross-country data. Moreover, most of the 
existing studies focus on the comparison between the US and a small number of European countries. 
Aaberge, Bjorklund, Jantti, Palme, Pedersen, Smith, and Wannemo (2002) compared income (family 
income, disposable income and earnings) inequality and mobility in the Scandinavian countries and the 
US during 1980-1990. Brukhauser and Poupore (1997) and Brukhauser, Holtz-Eakin, and Rhody (1998) 
compared earnings or disposable income mobility and inequality between Germany and the US between 
1983 and 1988. Fritzell (1990) studied mobility in Sweden between 1973 and 1980, and compared the 
results with Duncan and Morgan (1981) for the US between 1971 and 1978. The OECD (1996, 1997) 
presented a variety of comparisons of earnings inequality and mobility across OECD countries over the 
period  1986-1991.  Hofer  and  Weber  (2002)  looked  at  mobility  in  Austria  between  1986-1991  and 
compared their results with the OECD (1996, 1997) results for Denmark, Germany, Spain and the UK. 
The results vary depending on the definition and measure of mobility. Van Kerm (2004) looked at income 
mobility in Belgium, Western Germany and the USA between 1985 and 1997. Most recently, Fields 
(2008)  looked  at  the  US  and  France  between  the  1960s  and  the  1990s.  However,  no  consistent 
comparative study at the EU level. By exploiting the eight years of the ECHP, our paper aims to fill part 
of this gap and to make a substantive contribution to the literature on cross-national comparisons of 
earnings mobility at the EU level.  
Second, we bring additional evidence supporting the debate regarding the limitations of the Shorrocks 
index in capturing the equalizing/disequalizing effect of mobility (Benabou and Ok ,2001; Fields, 2008), 
and we argue for the need to complement the evidence brought by the Shorrocks index with an alternative 
measure  developed  by  Fields  (2008).  The  Fields  (2008)  index,  which  has  not  been  applied  in  any 
comparative study in Europe so far, is able to circumvent the limitations of the Shorrocks index, and thus 
bring  complementary  information  that  could  be  used  for  making  inferences  about  lifetime  income 
distributions. 
Third, unlike previous studies that rely on a fully balanced sample to explore mobility as an equalizer 
of longer-term incomes (only those individuals that record positive earnings independent of the sub-
period),  we  use  an  unbalanced  sample  over  different  sub-periods.  Thus  we  explore  mobility  as  an 
equalizer of longer term incomes not only for those employed over the entire sample period, but also for 
those that move into and out of employment. Focusing only on the fully balanced sample may bias the 
estimation  of  mobility  due  to  the  overestimation  of  earnings  persistency.  Moreover,  besides  the 
employment status, there are other factors determining panel attrition. All in all, this exercise provides an 
interesting check of the impact of differential attrition on the study of earnings mobility as an equalizer of 
longer term differentials using the Shorrock and the Fields index.  4 
 
2.  Data 
The study uses the European Community Household Panel (ECHP)
2 over the period 1994-2001 for 
14 EU countries. Not all countries are present for all waves. Luxembourg and Austria are observed over a 
period of 7 waves (1995-2001) and Finland over a period of 6 waves (1996-2001). Following the tradition 
of previous studies, the analysis focuses only on men.  
A special problem with panel data is that of attrition over time, as individuals are lost at successive 
dates causing the panel to decline in size and raising the problem of representativeness. Several papers 
analysed the extent and the determinants of panel attrition in ECHP. Behr, Bellgardt, Rendtel (2005) 
found that the extent and the determinants of panel attrition vary between countries and across waves 
within one country, but these differences do not bias the analysis of income or the ranking of the national 
results.  Ayala,  Navrro,  Sastre  (2006)  assessed  the  effects  of  panel  attrition  on  income  mobility 
comparisons for some EU countries from ECHP. The results show that ECHP attrition is characterized by 
a certain degree of selectivity, but only affecting some  variables and some countries. Moreover, the 
income  mobility  indicators  show  certain  sensitivity  to  the  weighting  system.  The  weighting  system 
applied here to correct for the attrition bias is the one recommended by Eurostat, namely using the “base 
weights” of the last wave observed for each individual, bounded between 0.25 and 10. The dataset is 
scaled up to a multiplicative constant
3 of the base weights of the last year observed for each individual. 
For this study we use real net
4 hourly wage adjusted for CPI of male workers aged 20 to 57, born 
between 1940 and 1981. Only observations with hourly wage lower than 50 Euros and higher than 1 Euro 
were considered in the analysis. The resulting sample for each country is an unbalanced panel. Details on 
the number of observations, inflows and outflows of the sample by cohort over time for each country are 
provided in Table 1. For more details on the inflows/outflows in the sample, see Sologon (2009, 2010). 
3.  Methodology 
In this study we explore the different facets of the inequality-mobility relationship at the EU-level 
using  three  mobility  measures  introduced  over  time  as  improved  alternatives  (For  a  review  of  the 
methodology used for measuring mobility, please refer to Fields and Ok, 1999; Fields, Leary, and Ok, 
2003). When exploring mobility, we have in mind Friedman’s (1978) arguments in favour of earnings 
mobility: it contributes to social mobility and equality of opportunity, and it reduces lifetime earnings 
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differentials  relative  to  annual  ones.  Thus  we  have  in  mind  two  aspects  of  mobility:  mobility  as 
opportunity, and mobility as equalizer of longer-term differentials. 
Mobility as opportunity to change positions in the earnings distributions between years 
The  opportunity  to  move  in  the  earnings  distribution  between  periods  is  best  reflected  by  rank 
measures, which capture positional movements in the distribution of earnings. Traditional rank measures 
are  derived  from  the  transition  matrix  approach  between  income  groups.  This  approach  to  mobility, 
however, fails to capture the movement within each income group, running the risk of underestimating 
the degree of mobility. An alternative approach, used in Dickens (1999), is to compute the ranking of the 
individuals in the wage distribution for each year and examine the degree of movement in percentile 
ranking from one year to the other. For each mobility comparison only individuals with positive earnings 
in both periods are considered. The measure of mobility between year t and year s is: 
    = 2 ∗ ∑ |        −        |  
      ⁄     (1) 
where F(wit) and F(wis) are the cumulative distribution function for earnings in year t and year s and N the 
number of individuals with positive earnings in both years. Based on this measure, the degree of mobility 
equals twice the average absolute change in percentile ranking between year t and year s. When there is 
no mobility M equals 0 - people maintain their earnings position from year t to s - the difference between 
        and         equals 0 for all individuals. M equals maximum 1 if earnings in the two years are 
perfectly negatively rank correlated - in the second period there is a complete reversal of ranks -, and the 
value 2/3 if earnings in the two periods are independent. The robustness of this measure of mobility was 
discussed in Dickens (1999). 
We estimate two types of mobility measures:  
(i) short-term mobility or 2-year period mobility M(t, t+1) - defined as mobility between periods one 
year apart, between year t and year t+1, used to assess the pattern of short-term mobility (in terms of 
opportunity to move) over time and its link with the evolution of cross-sectional inequality; 
(ii) long-term mobility or 8-year period mobility M(t, t+7) - defined as mobility between periods 
seven years apart, between year t and year t+7, used to assess the extent to which mobility increases with 
the time span.
 5 
This measure – referred to as “the Dickens index” in the rest of the paper - however, fails to formalize 
the relationship between earnings mobility and earnings inequality, limitation corrected by Shorrocks 
(1978), as explained in the next subsection. 
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Mobility - as opportunity to change positions in the distribution of long-term earnings relative to 
single-year earnings 
Shorrocks (1978) introduced a family of mobility measures that incorporates a close relationship 
between income mobility and income inequality. Mobility is measured as the relative reduction in the 
weighted average of single-year inequality when the accounting period is extended:
 6 
0 ≤    =   ∑       
    / ∑          ≤ 1  
                  (2). 
    represents individual annual earnings,    time   = 1,…, ,   is an inequality index that is a strictly 
convex function of incomes relative to the mean,   ∑       
     the inequality of lifetime income,    the 
share of earnings in year t of the total earnings over a T year period and        the cross-sectional annual 
inequality.      ranges  from  0  (perfect  mobility)  to  1  (complete  rigidity).
7  There  is  complete  income 
rigidity  if  lifetime  inequality  is  equal  to  the  weighted  sum  of  individual  period  income  inequalities, 
meaning that everybody holds their position in the income distribution from period to period. Perfect 
mobility is achieved when everybody has the same average lifetime income, meaning that there is a 
complete reversal of positions in the income distribution. The degree of mobility is computed as    =
1 −   . Shorrocks (1978)’s mobility definition is important from an economic point of view because it 
provides a way of identifying those countries that exhibit a high annual income inequality, but fares better 
when a longer period of time is considered. If a country A has both greater annual inequality and greater 
rigidity than country B, it will be more unequal than B whatever period is chosen for comparison. But if 
A  exhibits  more  mobility,  this  may  be  sufficient  to  change  the  rankings  when  longer  periods  are 
considered (Shorrocks, 1978).  
In the literature the Shorrocks index is usually classified among the measures of mobility as an 
equalizer of longer-term differentials. During recent years, however, the criticism that Shorrocks fails to 
capture the equalizing effect has been gaining momentum. Benabou and Ok (2001) and Fields (2008) 
highlighted the main limitation of the Shorrocks measure: it fails to quantify the direction and the extent 
of the difference between inequality of longer-term income and inequality of base year income, treating 
equalizing  and  disequalizing  changes  essentially  in  an  identical  fashion.  Our  study  brings  additional 
evidence for this criticism, and argues for the need to complement the evidence brought by the Shorrocks 
index with an alternative measure, able to capture the equalizing/disequalizing impact of mobility. Thus 
we opt for using the Shorrocks index as an overall measure of lifetime mobility – conceptualized as the 
opposite of earnings rigidity, which captures the opportunity to change positions in the distribution of 
long-term/lifetime earnings relative to the cross-sectional distribution. 
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Mobility - as equalizer of longer term differentials - Fields Index (2008)
8 
Fields (2008) proposed an alternative index, which circumvents the limitation of the Shorrocks index, 
capturing mobility as an equalizer/disequalizer of longer-tern incomes:  
  = 1 −             ⁄                    (3), 
where a a is the vector of average incomes,  yl is the vector of base-year incomes, and I(.) is a Lorenz-
consistent inequality measure such as the Gini coefficient or the Theil index. A positive/negative value of 
ε  indicate that average incomes,  a, are more/less equally distributed than the base-year incomes,  yl, 
and a 0 value that a and  ylare distributed equally unequally.For a complete description of the properties 
of the Fields index please refer to Fields (2008). 
By applying the Shorrocks and the Fields indices, we first assess the degree of long-term earnings 
mobility  across  14  EU  countries,  and  second  we  establish  whether  this  mobility  is  equalizing  or 
disequalizing long-term earnings differentials. We choose to work with the mobility index based on the 
Theil index, as it is more sensitive to the tails of the distribution.  
For each approach we estimate two types of mobility measures:  
(i) short-term mobility or 2-year period mobility M(t, t+1) – which for Shorrocks measures the degree 
to which the relative earnings positions observed on an annual basis are shuffled in the distribution of 2-
year earnings, and for Fields measures the extent to which mobility equalizes the inequality measured 
over a 2-year horizon relative to cross-sectional inequality in base year t;  
(ii) long-term mobility or 8
9-year period mobility M(t, t+7) – which for Shorrocks measures the 
degree to which the relative earnings positions observed on an annual basis are shuffled in the distribution 
of  8-year  earnings,  and  for  Fields  measures  the  extent  to  which  mobility  equalizes  the  inequality 
measured over a 8-year horizon relative to cross-sectional inequality in base year t.  
We distinguish between three types of inequality: cross-sectional inequality, short-term inequality – 
inequality in earnings measured over a 2-year horizon - and long-term inequality - inequality measured 
over the sample period horizon  
Most studies analysing mobility as an equalizer of longer-term differentials rely on a fully balanced 
panel, meaning only individuals recording positive earnings over the entire sample. The main drawback 
of  this  approach  is  the  exclusion  of  individuals  with  irregular  profiles,  thus  running  the  risk  of 
overestimating earnings persistency. Therefore, we opted for an “unbalanced” approach, meaning using 
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independence, positional movement, share movement, non-directional income movement, and directional income 
movement (Fields, 2008). 
9 7 for Luxembourg and Austria, and 6 for Finland. 8 
 
unbalanced  panels  across  different  sub-periods  (e.g.  the  mobility  index  for  1994-1997  is  based  on 
individuals with positive earnings in each year between 1994 and 1997, and not only on individuals with 
positive  earnings  over  the  entire  sample  period  1994-2001,  which  would  be  the  case  under  a  fully 
“balanced”  approach).  To  check,  however  for  the  impact  of  differentials  attrition,  we  report  both 
approaches.  
4.  Changes in earnings inequality 
We start by describing the evolution of the hourly earnings distribution both over time and across 
different time horizons, the ordering of countries with respect to hourly earnings inequality and how this 
ordering changes when the accounting period is extended from one to several years. The purpose is to get 
a glimpse into the intra-country and inter-country changes in the distribution of hourly earnings, both over 
time and across different horizons. 
Changes in cross-sectional distribution over time 
We start with the changing shape of the cross-sectional distribution of earnings for men over time. On 
average, men got richer over time in most countries except Austria. Plotting the percentage change in 
mean  hourly  earnings  between  the  beginning  of  the  sample  period  and  2001  at  each  point  of  the 
distribution for each country (Figure 1), reveals a negative and nearly monotonic relationship between the 
quantile rank and the growth in real earnings in most countries: the higher the rank, the smaller the 
increase in earnings. Thus hourly earnings of low-paid people improved to a larger extent than those of 
the better-off. The steepest profile is identified in Ireland, suggesting that across Europe, relative to high 
wage individuals, the Irish low wage individuals improved their wage situation the most. In Austria, 
people at the top of the distribution experienced a decrease in mean hourly wage over time, which may 
explain the decrease in the overall mean. Finland, Germany, Greece, and Netherlands diverge from the 
other EU countries experiencing a higher relative increase in earnings the higher the rank. Only in the 
Netherlands, men at the bottom of the income distribution recorded a deterioration of their work pay.  
The positive relationship between the quantile rank and the growth in real earnings may explain the 
increase in cross-sectional inequality found in the latter four countries, as captured by the Gini index, the 
Theil Index (GE(1)) and the Atkinson inequality index (aversion parameter=1) in Table 2
10. Consistent 
across indices, cross-sectional inequality is found to increase also in Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal, 
despite the negative association between the quantile rank and the growth in real earnings. A decrease in 
cross-sectional  inequality  over  time  is  found  in  the  remaining  countries.
11  These  trends  shuffled  the 
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therefore they illustrate different sides of the earnings distribution. 
11 The trends for Denmark, UK, Spain and Germany are consistent with Gregg and Vittori (2008). 9 
 
country ranking in cross-sectional inequality moderately, as illustrated by the rank correlation of 88,13% 
between the 1
st and last wave
12. The only constancy is found for Portugal and Denmark, which both in 
1994 and 2001, remain the most and the least unequal EU countries. Using Theil, in 1994, in between the 
two extremes, in ascending order of inequality we  find Finland (1996), Netherlands, Belgium,  Italy, 
Austria (1995), Germany, Greece, UK, Luxembourg (1995), Ireland, Spain, and France (gross). In 2001, 
in  between  the  two  extremes  we  find  Greece,  France,  Spain,  Luxembourg,  UK,  Germany,  Ireland, 
Netherlands, Italy, Finland, Belgium, and Austria. In general, these rankings are consistent across indices. 
Changes in the earnings distribution with the accounting period 
We complete the earnings distribution picture with the evolution of earnings inequality when we 
extend the horizon over which inequality is measured, using both an unbalanced and balanced sample 
(Table 3). As expected, the longer the horizon the lower the inequality in all countries, except Portugal 
under the balanced approach, where the 8-year inequality is higher than inequality in 1994.
13 Even based 
on average earnings over the whole sample period, a substantial inequality in the permanent component of 
earnings is still present in all countries. There is a tendency, however, for the intra-country differences to 
be smaller when earnings are averaged over several years than in single-year inequality comparisons: e.g. 
the standard deviation for the Gini coefficients of the eight-year average of earnings is 0.031, but around 
0.036  for  single-year  earnings.  The  ranking  in  long-term  inequality  changes  slightly  compared  with 
single-year inequality, as illustrated by the high rank correlation 95.16%. Denmark and Finland with the 
lowest inequality, and Portugal with the highest inequality maintain their ranks. Austria, Belgium and 
Netherlands converge to values close to Finland, followed by Italy, then Germany, UK, Luxembourg, 
Greece, Ireland with similar values, and finally France and Spain.  
Inequality measures based on the unbalanced approach are higher than those based on the balanced 
approach, not surprising given that people working over the entire sample are expected to have more 
stable jobs, and thus lower earnings differentials as opposed to the case when we include also those with 
unstable jobs.  
Next, we turn to the comparison of earnings mobility across the EU over the period 1994 – 2001.  
5.  Short-term mobility over time 
First, is there more mobility in terms of rank changes from one year to the next, in 2000 compared to 
the 1
st wave and what is the potential link with the evolution of cross-sectional inequality? The Dickens 
index in Table 4 illustrate that, over time, except Denmark, Ireland, Spain, and UK, all other countries 
record a decrease in short-term mobility, meaning in the opportunity to shift positions in the earnings 
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distribution between consecutive years. Linking with the evolution of cross-sectional inequality over time, 
we conclude that in 2000 men are: better off both in terms of their relative wage and opportunity to 
escape low pay in the next period in Denmark, Ireland, Spain, and UK; better off in terms of their relative 
wage, but worse off in terms of their chance to escape low pay the next period in Austria, Belgium and 
France; and worse off in terms of both in Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and 
Portugal. These findings, together with the highly significant negative correlation coefficient of -50.3%, 
bring evidence of a negative association between the evolution of short-term mobility and the evolution of 
cross-sectional  earnings  inequality  across  the  EU.  The  exceptions  –  Austria,  Belgium,  and  France  - 
however, support the debate that mobility is not always beneficial.  
Second,  to  formalize  the  link  between  the  evolution  of  mobility  and  inequality,  we  look  at  the 
Shorrocks  and  Fields  indices,  displayed  in  Table  4.  Short-term  mobility,  measured  by  the  2-year 
Shorrocks index, signals that in 2000 the chronically poor have an increased opportunity to improve their 
relative position in the distribution of short-term inequality (2-year period inequality) compared with the 
1
st wave only in Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, and Spain. However, the 2-year Fields index reveals that in 
2000 short-term mobility becomes more equalizing of 2-year earnings differentials compared with the 1st 
wave only in Ireland and Spain, whereas in the Netherlands it turns disequalizing. The differences in 
findings for Finland and Netherlands between the two indices reinforce the limitations of the Shorrocks 
measure put forward by Benabou and Ok (2001) and Fields (2008), thus the need to complement the 
evidence based on Shorrocks with the evidence based on Fields to understand the complex link between 
mobility and inequality. Both the unbalanced and the balanced approach confirm these trends (Figure 2), 
except for Spain, where under the “balanced” approach short-term Shorrocks mobility records a decrease, 
and Ireland where under the “balanced” approach short-term Fields mobility records a decrease. Overall, 
the Shorrocks index appears to be affected to a lesser extent by differential attrition compared with the 
Fields index. 
6.  Long-term mobility versus short-term mobility 
Finally, we turn to the comparison of earnings  mobility when we extend the period over which 
mobility is measured. The results are summarized in Table 5 and Figure 3.  
6.1.  Rank Mobility 
In  line  with  previous  studies,  consistent across  countries,  the longer the  period  over  which rank 
mobility is measured the higher the earnings mobility. Ireland stands out with the highest relative increase 
in rank mobility with the time span - almost 80%. Relating back to the strong negative relationship 11 
 
between the quintile rank and the growth in real earnings identified in Figure 1, we may conclude that the 
low wage individuals may be the main beneficiaries of this increase in mobility over the lifecycle.  
The ordering of countries in long-term mobility relative to short-term mobility changes substantially 
as illustrated by Figure 3 (Spearman rank correlation is rather small 51.82%). Luxembourg and Denmark 
are the least and the most mobile both short and long-term. In between we identify four country clusters: 
first, Spain, France and Germany; second, Netherlands and Portugal; third UK, Italy and Austria; fourth 
Greece, Finland, Belgium and Ireland. Judging whether this mobility is high or low depends on the 
question being asked. Long-term mobility is certainly high enough to make the point that people are not 
stuck at the bottom top of the earnings distribution. But is there enough mobility to wash out the effect of 
yearly inequality in a lifetime perspective? To answer, we turn to the Shorrocks and the Fields index. 
6.2.  Lifetime mobility 
So far we found that mobility increases with the horizon over which mobility is measured, meaning 
that the opportunity to change ones position in the cross-sectional earnings distribution is higher the more 
years elapse between periods. In this context the lifetime implications of these trends are of interest. Is 
there any earnings mobility in a lifetime perspective, meaning are the relative income positions observed 
on  an  annual  basis  shuffled  in  the  distribution  of  long-term  or  lifetime  earnings?  Is  this  mobility 
equalizing or disequalizing lifetime earnings differentials compared with annual earnings differentials?  
Stability profile – Shorrocks Index 
To answer the first question we look at the stability profile, both under the unbalanced and the 
balanced approach, illustrated in Table 5, Figure 4 and Figure 5.
14 To recall, the stability profile plots the 
Shorrocks rigidity index across different time horizons. In Figure 4 and Figure 5 the time horizons are 
expressed  in  reference  to  the  1
st  wave  for  each  country.  In  all  countries,  the  rigidity  declines 
monotonically as the time horizon is extended, meaning lifetime mobility is present. Thus all EU men do 
have an increasing mobility in the distribution of lifetime earnings as they advance in their career. This 
trend is consistent across approaches: the stability profiles under the two approaches evolve close to one 
another (Figure 4), sign of limited impact of differential attrition. Thus the overall conclusions are the 
same, independent of the approach.  
The ordering of countries in long-term mobility relative to short-term mobility changes slightly as 
illustrated  by  Figure  3  (Spearman  rank  correlation  is  quite  high  83.3%%).  Over  the  sample-span 
                                                           
14 Both figures contain the same information, organized differently for the ease of the interpretation. 12 
 
horizon
15, the highest mobility is recorded in Denmark, followed by Finland
16, Austria
17, UK, Belgium, 
Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Italy, France, Spain, Germany, Luxembourg
18 and the lowest, Portugal. 
Therefore Denmark provides the highest opportunity of reducing lifetime earnings differentials relative to 
cross-sectional ones, and Portugal the lowest.
19  
Mobility Profile – Fields - as equalizer of long-term earnings inequality 
Next we introduce the mobility profile based on the Fields index, which unlike Shorrocks, captures 
whether mobility is equalizing/disequalizing long-term differentials (Table 5, Figure 6, and Figure 7). 
Overall, mobility increases with the horizon for all countries, except Portugal. The evolution, however, is 
not monotonic for all countries. All countries except Portugal record positive values of mobility, showing 
that mobility is equalizing long-term earnings differentials. The story is confirmed by both approaches. 
For Portugal, mobility turns negative when measured over an 8-year horizon, showing that mobility is 
exacerbating long-term earning differentials relative to cross-sectional ones. 
Consistent across approaches, independent of the horizon, Portugal has the lowest profile, indicating 
the lowest mobility as equalizer of long term differentials (Figure 7). At the opposite country spectrum, 
Denmark and Ireland stand out with respect to the steepness of their profiles and to the high level of their 
long-term mobility. Some convergence trends emerge as the horizon over which mobility is measured 
increases. For a horizon of 7-8 years, mobility converges to similar values in Denmark and Ireland, in 
Belgium and France, in Spain and Germany, and in Luxembourg, Greece and Netherlands (Figure 7). 
The ordering of countries in long-term Fields mobility relative to short-term mobility changes to a 
larger extent compared with the Shorrocks index, but to a lesser extent compared with the Dickens index 
(Figure  3):  the  Spearman  rank  correlation  is  65.27%.  The  highest  long-term  (sample-span)  mobility 
(Figure 3 and Figure 8) is recorded in Ireland and Denmark, followed by Austria
20, France and Belgium 
with similar values, then UK, Finland
21, Greece, Netherlands, Luxembourg
22, Germany, Spain, Italy, and 
Portugal with a negative value. Thus, assuming that the 8-year mobility is a good approximation for 
lifetime mobility, Ireland and Denmark have the highest equalizing mobility in a lifetime perspective, and 
                                                           
15 The sample span covers 8 years for 11 countries, 7 years for Austria and Luxembourg, 6 years for Finland. Note 
that the balanced and unbalanced approaches are the same for the sample-span horizon, as the sample is the same. 
16 Finland has the same ranking when comparing all countries over a 6-year horizon. 
17 Austria has the same ranking when comparing all countries over a 7-year or 6-year horizon.  
18 Idem for Luxembourg.  
19 The ranking between Denmark, UK, Spain and Germany is consistent with the one found by Gregg and Vittori 
(2008) using the Shorrocks index based on all indices considered, including Theil and Gini. 
20 Austria has the same ranking when comparing all countries over a 7-year or 6-year-horizon.  
21 Finland has the same ranking when comparing all countries over a 6-year horizon. 
22 Luxembourg has the same ranking when comparing all countries over a 7-year or 6-year horizon. 13 
 
Italy, Spain and Germany the lowest. Portugal is the only country where mobility acts as a disequalizer of 
lifetime differentials. 
Comparing between Figure 6 and Figure 4, the Fields index appears to be affected to a larger extent 
by differential attrition than the Shorrocks index.  
Inferences for lifetime inequality ranking 
The  overall  information  revealed  by  the  two  indices  is  summarized  in  Figure  8  and  Table  5. 
Comparing the rankings in long-term mobility between the Shorrocks and the Fields index the mobility 
pictures differ to a moderate extent, confirmed also by the moderate Spearman rank correlation (70.55%) 
between the long-term Shorrocks and Fields index. Portugal records the lowest values based on both 
indices.  Lifetime  mobility  is  present  in  Portugal,  but  is  disequalizing,  thus  it  does  not  benefit  the 
chronically poor. Denmark, Finland, Austria, UK, Belgium and Ireland rank among the seven highest in 
both Shorrocks and Fields lifetime mobility, suggesting that they have the highest lifetime mobility with 
the highest equalizing impact on lifetime earnings differentials. Denmark scores the highest in lifetime 
mobility, but the second highest after Ireland in equalizing mobility, suggesting that mobility in Ireland is 
slightly more equalizing in a lifetime perspective than in Denmark. Compared with the other countries, 
Denmark has a higher lifetime mobility with a higher lifetime equalizing impact.  
Linking back with the ranking in long-term inequality, we attempt to make inferences regarding 
lifetime  inequality  country  rankings.  We  start  from  the  country  rankings  in  long-term  inequality  in 
Section 4, and try to deduce the potential re-rankings that may take place in a lifetime perspective. 
Denmark is the least unequal long-term, has the highest Shorrocks mobility and the most equalizing 
mobility, thus it is expected to have the lowest inequality in a lifetime perspective. At the opposite 
extreme we find unequivocally Portugal. Austria may become less unequal than Finland in a lifetime 
perspective,  given  that  Austria  has  a  higher  equalizing  mobility.  Irrespective  of  their  relative  ranks, 
Finland and Austria are expected to be among the three least unequal countries in a lifetime perspective 
after  Denmark.  For  the  other  countries,  we  do  not  always  find  a  complete  consistency  in  lifetime 
inequality rankings based on the Shorrocks and the Field indices. For example, Germany may become 
less unequal than Italy in a lifetime perspective, given its more equalizing mobility, and more unequal 
given its lower Shorrocks mobility. The examples do not stop here, indicating that the Shorrocks and the 
Fields index indeed capture different facets of mobility. More should be done in the future to settle this 
dilemma. 
We complete the ranking in lifetime inequality relying on the Fields index. Diagram 1 illustrates the 
ranking. Belgium has a lower long-term mobility and a higher equalizing mobility than all countries, 
except Denmark, Finland and Austria, thus is expected to be the fourth country in lifetime inequality. 14 
 
Netherlands and the UK are expected to rank next in lifetime inequality. They may interchange ranks 
however, given that the UK has a more equalizing long-term mobility than the Netherlands. Next we 
expect to find a cluster formed by Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, Greece, Ireland and France, expect to 
interchange  their ranks.  At the end  of  the lifetime  inequality  spectrum  we  expect  to  find  Spain and 
Portugal, which have the highest long-term inequality and the least equalizing mobility.  
7.  Concluding remarks 
This study approached the mobility-inequality relationship at the EU level over the period 1994-2001 
on two axes: first the evolution of short-term inequality and its link with cross-sectional inequality and 
short-term inequality; second, the evolution of long-term mobility relative to short-term mobility and the 
implications for lifetime or long-term inequality. Our results can be summarized briefly.  
The changing shape of the distribution of hourly earnings in the EU after 1994 illustrates that hourly 
earnings of the low paid individuals improved to a larger extent than those of the better off in most 
countries, except in the Netherlands, Germany, Greece and Finland, where the opposite holds. Moreover, 
Netherlands is the only country where low paid men recorded a deterioration in their work pay. These 
trends  may  explain  the  increase  in  cross-sectional  inequality  in  these  four  countries.  Cross-sectional 
inequality is found to increase also in Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal, despite the negative association 
between the quintile rank and the growth in real earnings.  
For understanding these trends in cross-sectional earnings inequality we looked at the evolution of 
short-term mobility. We find evidence supporting a negative association between the evolution of cross-
sectional inequality and short-term rank mobility across the EU. In Germany, Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
Italy, Greece, Finland and Portugal the decrease in mobility as identified by the evolution of the short-
term  Dickens  rank  mobility  index  may  be  a  possible  explanation  for  the  increase  in  cross-sectional 
inequality. Additional proof is found in Denmark, UK, Ireland, and Spain, where the increase in short-
term rank mobility appears to have an equalizing effect on cross-sectional differentials: : in 2000, men are 
better off both in terms of their relative wage and their opportunity to escape low pay in the next period. 
Some  exceptions  are  present,  supporting  the  debate  that  mobility  is  not  always  beneficial,  having  a 
disequalizing effect: in 2000, men in Belgium, France and Austria are found to be better off in terms of 
their relative wage, despite being worst off in terms of their chance to escape low pay next year. 
The rank measures, however do not incorporate the relationship between income mobility and income 
inequality. To achieve this link, we explored an alternative class of mobility measures – as equalizer of 
longer-term earnings. First, we explored the traditional Shorrocks index, which, given its limitations in 
capturing the equalizing effects put forward by Benabou and Ok (2001) and Fields (2008), is interpreted 
here as the earnings mobility in a long-term perspective, meaning the opportunity that men have to shuffle 15 
 
long-term their relative income positions observed on an annual basis. Second we introduced the Fields 
index, which circumvents the limitations of the Shorrcks index. To asses how the equalizing effect of 
mobility changed over time we choose the shortest horizon – periods one year apart.  
The 2-year Shorrocks index signals that in 2000 men have an increased opportunity to improve their 
relative position in the distribution of short-term inequality (2-year period inequality) compared with the 
1
st wave only in the Netherlands, Ireland, Spain and Finland. The 2-year Fields index, however, reveals 
that in 2000 short-term mobility becomes more equalizing of 2-year earnings differentials compared with 
the 1
st wave only in Ireland and Spain, whereas in the Netherlands it turns disequalizing.  
The contradiction in the findings for the Netherlands and Finland between the Shorrocks and the 
Fields index puts forward the need of complementing the two indices for a complete picture: in the 
Netherlands,  mobility  increases  (based  on  Shorrocks),  but  it  turns  disequalizing  of  2-year  earnings 
differentials (based on Fields). Linking back to the evolution of the short-term rank mobility and to the 
positive association found between the quantile rank and the growth in real earnings, we conclude that in 
the Netherlands the changes in the labour market favoured the better off individuals in the detriment of 
the low paid men. Similarly in Finland, but to a much lesser extent, as short-term mobility just decreased 
its equalizing impact remaining positive.  
Shifting from the short-term to the long-term perspective, we find that the ranking in long-term 
inequality does not change to a large extent compared with annual inequality, sign of limited lifetime 
mobility within countries, either equalizing or disequalizing: Portugal remains by far the most unequal 
EU country, and Denmark and Finland the least unequal even over an 8-year horizon. The ranking in 
earnings  mobility  differs,  both  across  indices  and  across  horizons.  Long-term,  Denmark  renders 
unequivocally the most mobile earnings distribution with the second highest equalizing effect in the EU. 
Using the rank measure, men in Luxembourg are found to have the lowest opportunity to improve their 
position in the distribution of earnings long-term. In terms of the opportunity to shuffle long-term the 
relative income positions observed on an annual basis, the lowest value is found in Portugal. The least 
equalizing  long-term  mobility  is  found  in  Italy,  and  the  only  disequalizing  mobility  in  a  lifetime 
perspective in  Portugal.  Coupling  the  information  provided by  the  Shorrocks and the  Fields indices, 
across the EU, Denmark,  Finland, Austria, UK, Belgium, and  Ireland are found to have the highest 
lifetime mobility with the highest equalizing impact on lifetime earnings differentials.  
Linking the rankings in long-term Fields mobility with the rankings in long-term inequality, we form 
expectations regarding the country ranking in lifetime inequality: unequivocally, Denmark is expected to 
have the lowest lifetime earnings inequality across the 14 EU countries, and Spain and Portugal the 
highest. After Denmark, among the least three unequal countries we expect Finland and Austria, followed 16 
 
on the fourth place by Belgium. Next, with a higher lifetime inequality we expect Netherlands and/or UK, 
then the other six countries. 
Besides making a substantive contribution to the literature on cross-national comparisons of earnings 
mobility at the EU level, our paper contributes to the existing literature in two more ways. First, we bring 
evidence regarding  the  limitation  of  the  Shorrocks  measure  in  capturing  the  equalizing/disequalizing 
effect of mobility, put forward by Benabou and Ok (2001) and Fields (2008). We argue for the need to 
complement  the  information  brought  by  the  Shorrocks  index  with  additional  measures  that  capture 
mobility as an equalizer of long-term differentials, in the tradition of Fields (2008), in order to make 
inferences  regarding  lifetime  earnings  distributions.  Second,  by  comparing  the  findings  between  the 
“unbalanced”  and  the  “balanced  approach”,  meaning  between  including/and  not  the  individuals  that 
exited and (re)entered the panel, we explored the impact of differential attrition on the study of earnings 
mobility as an equalizer of long-term differentials. The Fields index is found to be more sensitive to 
differential  attrition  than  Shorrocks.  The  overall  qualitative  conclusions  regarding  the  evolution  of 
mobility over time and across horizons are not affected, whereas more differences are observed for the 
country rankings.  
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Table 1. Inflows and Outflows of Individuals in the Sample 
t  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Germany  N | Waget >0  25018  26059  25806  24889  23290  22955  21909  20703 
  N| balanced  11057 
  (%t-1 |Waget >0)    66.99  67.37  66.2  63.01  64.84  64.86  64.39 
Denmark  N | Waget >0  20899  20399  19190  19062  17321  16235  15678  15380 
  N| balanced  8247 
  (%t-1 |Waget >0)    68.74  66.59  69.43  66.23  67.41  69.6  71.6 
Netherlands  N | Waget >0  20221  22100  22892  22753  22863  23233  24065  24130 
  N| balanced  8173 
  (%t-1 |Waget >0)    69.07  71.37  68.68  67.52  67.24  68.56  69.59 
Belgium  N | Waget >0  35342  34367  33280  32378  31129  29414  28087  26538 
  N| balanced  16910 
  (%t-1 |Waget >0)    63.43  63.65  64.38  63.88  64.28  65.15  64.38 
Luxembourg  N | Waget >0    15829  13695  14489  13403  14075  12667  12992 
  N| balanced  7283 
  (%t-1 |Waget >0)      64.75  69.48  69.33  69.81  68.71  70.39 
France  
(gross amounts) 
N | Waget >0  20137  19270  19042  17906  14467  14012  13760  14212 
N| balanced  5895 
  (%t-1 |Waget >0)    62.47  64.76  62  52.08  54.24  55.54  60.8 
UK  N | Waget >0  24949  25329  25495  26010  26145  25750  25674  25264 
  N| balanced  13977 
  (%t-1 |Waget >0)    64.59  66.31  67.06  67.04  67.36  68.33  68.58 
Ireland  N | Waget >0  13937  13221  12590  12515  12435  12091  10745  9727 
  N| balanced  4453 
  (%t-1 |Waget >0)    49.99  50.04  52.41  53.13  54.1  51.63  54.65 
Italy  N | Waget >0  32633  32236  32111  29661  28865  26993  26912  25170 
  N| balanced  12070 
  (%t-1 |Waget >0)    51.58  51.19  47.18  47.34  46.87  48.73  48.86 
Greece  N | Waget >0  27974  27654  26150  24865  22675  22001  21335  21929 
  N| balanced  9404 
  (%t-1 |Waget >0)    45.83  45.69  44.98  42.09  43.52  46.06  49.72 
Spain  N | Waget >0  22559  21863  21296  20975  20371  20580  19898  20185 
  N| balanced  7234 
  (%t-1 |Waget >0)    47.6  48.29  48.49  48.63  52.13  52.12  56.06 
Portugal  N | Waget >0  14653  15450  15379  15087  14837  14569  14604  14550 
  N| balanced  6214 
  (%t-1 |Waget >0)    57.84  57.5  57.32  56.98  59.12  60.83  62.16 
Austria  N | Waget >0    17944  17789  17199  16209  15162  13816  13056 
  N| balanced  8127 
  (%t-1 |Waget >0)      67.96  68.2  67.49  67.2  66.51  68.21 
Finland  N | Waget >0      15811  15845  15895  15546  13329  13057 
  N| balanced  6913 
  (%t-1 |Waget >0)        55.95  57.2  59.29  53.83  64.16 
Note: N| Waget >0 refers to the number of individuals recording positive hourly earnings expressed in Euro in year t. N|balanced 
is the number of individuals with positive earnings over the entire period. (%t-1 | Waget >0) is the share of individuals present in 
the sample in year t-1 which record positive earnings in year t. 
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Table 2. Earnings Inequality (Index*100) 
    1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Germany 
Gini  22.15  22.34  22.04  21.89  22.58  22.81  22.75  22.54 
Theil  8.22  8.61  8.23  8.06  8.85  8.96  8.92  8.72 
A(1)  8.08  8.38  8.04  7.84  8.12  8.53  8.41  8.17 
Denmark 
Gini  15.76  15.26  15.52  15.21  14.24  14.68  14.94  14.05 
Theil  4.22  3.92  4.23  4.15  3.37  3.73  3.83  3.35 
A(1)  4.26  3.78  4.10  3.96  3.37  3.76  3.78  3.33 
Netherlands 
Gini  18.07  18.37  19.19  18.80  18.93  17.92  18.18  20.67 
Theil  5.63  5.76  6.32  6.07  5.96  5.40  5.56  7.25 
A(1)  5.56  5.77  6.33  5.90  5.65  5.18  5.44  7.08 
Belgium 
Gini  19.10  17.71  17.64  18.13  17.53  17.33  17.13  17.85 
Theil  6.23  5.37  5.35  5.58  5.15  5.11  5.04  5.48 
A(1)  5.92  4.95  5.04  5.24  4.85  4.92  4.69  5.14 
Luxembourg 
Gini    25.23  24.74  25.41  25.62  26.58  26.50  26.32 
Theil    10.09  9.85  10.24  10.37  11.19  11.15  10.89 
A(1)    9.88  10.00  10.16  10.02  10.95  11.09  10.66 
France 
Gini  27.62  26.47  26.26  27.23  27.28  27.41  26.83  26.49 
Theil  13.21  12.04  11.63  12.88  12.58  12.65  11.94  11.87 
A(1)  11.64  10.88  10.58  11.41  11.54  11.59  11.17  10.98 
UK 
Gini  24.26  24.22  23.35  23.36  23.54  23.25  23.35  23.51 
Theil  10.08  10.01  9.20  9.05  9.24  9.08  9.16  9.29 
A(1)  9.25  9.19  8.57  8.46  8.55  8.32  8.46  8.51 
Ireland 
Gini  27.59  26.87  25.76  25.47  25.00  23.39  22.77  21.70 
Theil  12.87  11.97  11.00  10.83  10.60  9.31  8.78  7.85 
A(1)  11.84  11.21  10.50  10.14  9.85  8.66  8.15  7.64 
Italy 
Gini  19.16  18.47  19.02  18.93  19.85  19.72  19.78  19.90 
Theil  6.51  6.08  6.42  6.29  7.13  7.01  7.08  7.19 
A(1)  5.99  5.58  5.91  5.78  6.41  6.30  6.33  6.39 
Greece 
Gini  23.62  24.37  23.80  25.55  25.66  26.98  26.51  26.37 
Theil  9.51  9.97  9.44  11.23  11.09  12.20  11.93  12.17 
A(1)  8.77  9.13  8.70  9.97  9.99  10.97  10.68  10.55 
Spain 
Gini  27.87  28.27  28.19  28.71  28.37  26.99  26.36  26.07 
Theil  13.08  13.22  13.36  13.67  13.47  12.69  12.09  11.47 
A(1)  11.84  12.13  11.94  12.33  12.17  11.07  10.60  10.28 
Portugal 
Gini  30.05  31.14  30.66  30.85  31.13  30.11  31.32  31.72 
Theil  15.79  16.93  16.76  17.27  18.01  17.21  18.86  19.27 
A(1)  13.23  14.16  13.80  14.05  14.37  13.55  14.60  14.92 
Austria 
Gini    19.49  18.34  18.34  17.39  17.07  16.72  16.85 
Theil    6.67  5.84  5.90  5.27  5.10  4.93  4.97 
A(1)    6.44  5.62  5.52  4.87  4.80  4.67  4.82 
Finland 
Gini      17.32  17.80  17.30  17.81  17.10  18.50 
Theil      5.22  5.46  5.23  5.38  5.08  5.98 
A(1)      4.94  5.29  4.83  5.19  4.76  5.53 19 
 
Table 3. Short and Long-term inequality 
Inequality (Theil)  Ge  Dk  Nl  Be  Lu  Fr  UK  Ir  It  Gr  Sp  Pt  Au  Fi 
Unbalanced                             
1st wave  0.0822  0.0422  0.0563  0.0623  0.1009  0.1321  0.1008  0.1287  0.0651  0.0951  0.1308  0.1579  0.0667  0.0522 
1st wave - 2nd wave  0.0744  0.0316  0.0468  0.0496  0.0869  0.106  0.0866  0.1109  0.054  0.0801  0.1179  0.1524  0.0514  0.0422 
1st wave -3rd wave  0.0714  0.0288  0.0458  0.0454  0.0786  0.0958  0.0775  0.0979  0.0512  0.0745  0.1124  0.1474  0.0479  0.0398 
1st wave – 4th wave  0.0688  0.0266  0.0443  0.043  0.0751  0.0931  0.0726  0.0916  0.0495  0.0767  0.1078  0.1449  0.043  0.036 
1st wave – 5th wave  0.0655  0.0252  0.0435  0.0419  0.074  0.0929  0.0685  0.086  0.0497  0.0729  0.106  0.144  0.0399  0.0351 
1st wave – 6th wave  0.0623  0.0232  0.0424  0.0399  0.0678  0.0915  0.0653  0.0819  0.049  0.0756  0.1046  0.1381  0.0372  0.0346 
1st wave-7th wave  0.0602  0.0211  0.0416  0.0388  0.0664  0.0874  0.0635  0.0786  0.0496  0.0732  0.1  0.1393  0.0371   
1st wave-8th wave  0.06  0.0205  0.0395  0.0395    0.0847  0.063  0.0718  0.0494  0.0698  0.0929  0.1423     
Balanced                             
1st wave  0.0709  0.0329  0.0479  0.0516  0.0797  0.1113  0.0803  0.1163  0.0573  0.0848  0.1092  0.1414  0.0500  0.0422 
1st wave - 2nd wave  0.0655  0.0282  0.0431  0.0425  0.0701  0.0971  0.0709  0.1042  0.0520  0.0744  0.0966  0.1340  0.0438  0.0373 
1st wave -3rd wave  0.0644  0.0264  0.0431  0.0408  0.0671  0.0908  0.0676  0.0917  0.0500  0.0737  0.0944  0.1380  0.0411  0.0347 
1st wave – 4th wave  0.0624  0.0241  0.0416  0.0403  0.0667  0.0889  0.0653  0.0866  0.0479  0.0728  0.0940  0.1388  0.0394  0.0348 
1st wave – 5th wave  0.0617  0.0229  0.0407  0.0403  0.0667  0.0881  0.0636  0.0822  0.0485  0.0715  0.0942  0.1373  0.0380  0.0342 
1st wave – 6th wave  0.0611  0.0219  0.0401  0.0395  0.0665  0.0871  0.0632  0.0791  0.0487  0.0714  0.0938  0.1382  0.0375  0.0346 
1st wave-7th wave  0.0604  0.0210  0.0393  0.0396  0.0664  0.0854  0.0632  0.0749  0.0491  0.0702  0.0942  0.1400  0.0371   
1st wave-8th wave  0.0600  0.0205  0.0395  0.0395    0.0847  0.0630  0.0718  0.0494  0.0698  0.0929  0.1423     
Table 4. Short-term mobility over time – unbalanced  
Mobility Index  Ge  Dk  Nl  Be  Lu  Fr  UK  Ir  It  Gr  Sp  Pt  Au  Fi 
Dickens                             
1
st wave - 2
nd wave  18.85  26.65  19.33  27.01  14.39  22.50  21.12  21.43  25.52  29.52  21.51  20.64  28.61  26.39 
2000-2001  17.44  27.08  19.00  20.71  13.07  17.28  21.67  23.37  20.53  18.68  26.08  17.17  19.16  25.27 
Shorocks                             
1
st wave - 2
nd wave  0.053  0.108  0.078  0.106  0.051  0.107  0.088  0.077  0.085  0.130  0.065  0.048  0.108  0.111 
2000-2001  0.046  0.108  0.082  0.057  0.042  0.055  0.073  0.078  0.060  0.058  0.078  0.040  0.062  0.114 
Fields                             
1
st wave - 2
nd wave  0.067  0.168  0.085  0.170  0.080  0.153  0.116  0.127  0.094  0.131  0.091  0.057  0.130  0.104 
2000-2001  0.053  0.165  -0.018  0.050  0.072  0.067  0.102  0.128  0.051  0.050  0.121  0.028  0.056  0.023 20 
 
Table 5. Short-term and long-term mobility 
Mobility Index  Ge  Dk  Nl  Be  Lu  Fr  UK  Ir  It  Gr  Sp  Pt  Au  Fi 
Dickens                             
1st wave - 2nd wave  0.189  0.267  0.193  0.270  0.144  0.225  0.211  0.214  0.255  0.295  0.215  0.206  0.286  0.264 
1st wave -3rd wave  0.223  0.314  0.202  0.282  0.170  0.243  0.239  0.276  0.279  0.302  0.249  0.256  0.312  0.304 
1st wave – 4th wave  0.242  0.355  0.226  0.311  0.172  0.259  0.260  0.299  0.304  0.315  0.250  0.273  0.321  0.346 
1st wave – 5th wave  0.251  0.389  0.259  0.300  0.188  0.251  0.292  0.331  0.329  0.332  0.257  0.283  0.347  0.358 
1st wave – 6th wave  0.265  0.385  0.276  0.333  0.205  0.279  0.305  0.335  0.333  0.324  0.275  0.303  0.360  0.365 
1st wave-7th wave  0.281  0.405  0.305  0.351  0.224  0.291  0.338  0.356  0.343  0.359  0.303  0.323  0.357   
1st wave-8th wave  0.305  0.427  0.318  0.372    0.300  0.351  0.384  0.354  0.378  0.296  0.320     
Shorrocks                             
1st wave - 2nd wave  0.053  0.108  0.078  0.106  0.051  0.107  0.088  0.077  0.085  0.130  0.065  0.048  0.108  0.111 
1st wave -3rd wave  0.086  0.156  0.097  0.130  0.076  0.130  0.128  0.116  0.106  0.145  0.093  0.069  0.150  0.150 
1st wave – 4th wave  0.093  0.186  0.111  0.155  0.083  0.141  0.149  0.128  0.122  0.156  0.102  0.079  0.167  0.173 
1st wave – 5th wave  0.092  0.217  0.127  0.159  0.089  0.140  0.165  0.146  0.137  0.168  0.107  0.080  0.177  0.188 
1st wave – 6th wave  0.108  0.235  0.141  0.171  0.100  0.141  0.172  0.160  0.145  0.169  0.109  0.080  0.193  0.218 
1st wave-7th wave  0.115  0.260  0.150  0.187  0.104  0.137  0.180  0.165  0.145  0.175  0.120  0.080  0.198   
1st wave-8th wave  0.124  0.267  0.173  0.185    0.135  0.186  0.176  0.149  0.180  0.132  0.093     
Fields                             
1st wave - 2nd wave  0.067  0.168  0.085  0.170  0.080  0.153  0.116  0.127  0.094  0.131  0.091  0.057  0.130  0.104 
1st wave -3rd wave  0.115  0.199  0.087  0.205  0.119  0.194  0.177  0.233  0.122  0.150  0.120  0.063  0.190  0.132 
1st wave – 4th wave  0.129  0.260  0.099  0.201  0.135  0.222  0.222  0.279  0.141  0.150  0.118  0.064  0.251  0.139 
1st wave – 5th wave  0.105  0.272  0.115  0.218  0.142  0.224  0.215  0.329  0.122  0.123  0.140  0.049  0.226  0.172 
1st wave – 6th wave  0.121  0.309  0.140  0.237  0.161  0.238  0.224  0.374  0.141  0.130  0.140  0.070  0.239  0.180 
1st wave-7th wave  0.141  0.356  0.160  0.232  0.167  0.231  0.223  0.342  0.145  0.167  0.136  0.048  0.259   
1st wave-8th wave  0.153  0.376  0.175  0.235    0.240  0.216  0.382  0.138  0.177  0.149  -0.007     
                            Notes: * 7
th wave for Austria and Luxembourg, 6



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3. Short and Long-Term Mobility 



























































































































































































































Long-term Fields Mobility24 
 
 
Figure 4. Stability Profiles for Male Earnings by Selected Countries (based on Theil) – Balanced vs Unbalanced 
Note: The stability profile plots the rigidity index against the horizon over which the index is measured: 1-year rigidity = 1; 2-year rigidity = rigidity index over a horizon of 2 
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Figure 5. Stability Profiles for Male Earnings for Selected Countries (based on Theil) - – Balanced 
vs Unbalanced 
Note: The stability profile plots the rigidity index against the horizon over which the index is measured: 1-year rigidity = 1; 2-
year rigidity = rigidity index over a horizon of 2 years, span wave(1)-wave(2); 8-year rigidity = rigidity index over a horizon of 8 






















































Figure 6. Mobility Profile based on the Fields Index 
Note: The mobility profile plots the Fields index against the horizon over which the index is measured: 1-year mobility = 1; 2-year mobility = mobility index over a horizon of 2 






































































































































































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Span(wave(1) - wave(t))
Finland
Fields - balanced approach
Fields - unbalanced approach27 
 
 
Figure 7. Mobility Profile based on the Fields Index 
Note: The mobility profile plots the Fields index against the horizon over which the index is measured: 1-year mobility = 1; 2-
year mobility = mobility index over a horizon of 2 years, span wave(1)-wave(2); 8-year mobility = mobility index over a horizon 


























































Panel B: Balanced sample over sub-periods28 
 
 
Figure 8. Scatter plot of long-term (6-year, 7-year and 8-year) mobility: Shorrocks vs. Fields 
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Diagram 1. Lifetime Earnings Inequality Ranking 
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